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~x-. Justice: 
The SG has filed a Supplemental Memo-
randum. It points out that the Eighth Cir-
cuit has just decided a similar case in 
which it recognized that the Ninth Circui t's 
Wheeler decision was directly on point, but 
refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's holding. 
The Eighth Circuit case is called United 
States v. Walkiny Crow. The Eighth Circuit 
declared that fo lowing the Wheeler case 
"might mean that the felony jurisdiction 
conferred on the federal courts • • • could 
in instances be frustrated by relatively minor 
prosecutions in tribal courts. Such a situ-
ation _. would be undesirable and might lead 
to still further congressional enc~hment 
on the jurisdiction of those courts.' 
The fact that there is now a clear 




whether the Fifth Amendment precludes trial for rape in federal 
district court following conviction for contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor and "disor?e+lY conduct under Navajo tribal 
law. 
2. FACTS: Defendant respondent is a Navajo. He pled -guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor and disorderly 
conduct before a Navajo tribal court. Over a year later, he 
was convicted in a federal district court for statutory rape. 
The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, 2032 (1970) makes it 
/~~ (-L.._~/-'?) 
~ 
a federal offense (with jurisdiction in the federal district 
court) to commitonanfudian reservation any of a specified list 
of crimes. Both charges arose out of the same occurrence. The 
Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction on the grounds of double 
jeopardy. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The Solicitor General petitions for 
certiorari on two alternate grounds. First, he argues that there 
is no double jeopardy where the offenses were separate crimes 
against two separate sovereigns. The Ninth Circuit opinion 
relies on the Tenth Amendment for the proposition that a power 
not explicitly given to the federal government is reserved to 
the states. Hence, all power is to be found in either the states 
or the federal government. Since Indian tribes are not subject 
to the control of state governments, the Ninth Circuit ccncluded 
that they must exercise a form of federal jurisdiction. Hence, 
the same sovereig~ in involved. The Solicitor contends that 
Indian tribes constitute a third type of sovereign recognized 
by the Constitution. 
Secondly, the Solicitor argues that, even if Indian tribes 
are held to exercise jurisdiction of a federal nature, the two 




1. Jeopardy does not apply to different sovereigns. 
In 1847, the Supreme Court in Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 
410, first recognized an exception to the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy where the two crimes were offenses against 
( 
different sovereigns. The same principle has continually been 
reaffirmed 59 U.S. 187 (1959), approved con-
court for crimes stemming from the 
identical set of facts, because "two sovereignties, deriving 
power from different sources" had been offended, citing U.S. v. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). This Court has addressed the 
question of what is necessary to constitute an independent 
sovereign i n-W5ller v. Fla., 397 U.S. 387 (1970), where sequential 
prosecutions in municipal and state court were ·held to violate the 
double jeopardy provision. Double jeopardy was involved because 
"the judicial power to try petitioner on the first charges in 
municipal court springs from the same organic law that created the 
state court of general jurisdiction in which petitioner was 
tried and convicted for a felony." 
Waller relied heavily on Grafton v. U.S., 206 u.s. 334 
(1907). !~he courts martial and the territorial court 
of the Philipp1nes were held to be courts of the same sovereignty 
for double jeopardy purposes. "[T]he two tribunals that tried 
the accused exert all their powers under and by authority of the 
same government--tha-e of the United States." "The Government of 
a State does not derive its powers from the United States, while 
the Government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly 
to the United States, and its judicial tribunals exert all their 
powers by authority of the United States. The jurisdiction and 
authority of the United States over that territory and its inhabitants , 
for all legitimate purposes of government, is paramount." 206 
U.S. at 334-335. 
.··,· Tqe test thus appears to be whether the jurisdictions -
involved originally derived their authority from the same government. 
Territorial courts, military courts, district courts, and -for the commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico v. Shell co., ~ 
302 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1937)) have all been held to find their 
source of authority in the federal government. Only state 
governments, and the authority exercised by municipalities created 
by the states, have been found not to derive their authority 
from the federal government. 
Indian tribunals must be fitted within this scheme. 
There is no serious question that the authority of Indian tribunals 
is not a creature of state law. Either Indian jurisdiction is 
granted by federal authority, or Indian tribes constitute a 
respons~ to the case of Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
In that case, this Court held that federal jurisdiction did 
not extend to murder of one Indian by another on a reservation. 
The Indian tribes were seen to start out with plenary authority. 
The fact that the Congress could specify certain crimes to 
.be removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts does 
not deny the "residual sovereignty" of the tribe. 
In holding that the states could not exert jurisdiction 
over civil suits by non-Indians against Indians concerning 
business on the reservation, this Court emphasized the aboriginal 
authority of the Indian tribes over their own affairs. Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 1'There can be no doubt that to 
allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine 
the authority of the tribal courts over reservation affairs 
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern 
themselves." 358 U.S. 223. Neverthelesa, even when citing 
Worcester v. Ga., 6 Pet. 515 (1832), the Court's opinion recog-
nizes the p e rvasive authority of the federal goyernmen t QYO~ 
Indian affairs. "The whole intercourse between the United States 
and this [Cherokee] nation, is, by our constitution and laws, 
vested in the government of the United States." 6 Pet. at 561, 
cited at 358 U.S. at 218-19. 
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), dealt e xplicitly 
with whethe r the existence of federal authority was incompatible 
with residual sovereignty in Indian tribes. "True it is that in 
many adjudications of this Court the fact has been fully recog-
nized, that although possessed of these attributes of local 
self government, when exercising their tribal functions, all 
such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of 
the United States .... But the existence of the right in Congress 
to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee 
Nation shall be exercised does not render such local powers 
Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of 
the United States." 
To the extent that there has been federal regulation of 
crimes on reservations, it has not been through a comprehensive 
code, but rather by express exceptions to what is conceded 
otherwise to be, and always to have been, within tribal juris-
diction. That is the viewpoint taken by another panel of the Ninth 
Circuit in Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976), a 
case denying habeas relief to a non-Indian. taken into custody 
by tribal police: "The proper approach to the question of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction is to ask 'first, what the original 
POST-ARGUMENT MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Jan. 12, 1978 
RE: United States v. Wheeler 
The argument in this case shifted my thinking 
significantly and makes me incline in favor of reversal, 
i.e., a holding that Indian tribes are a separate sovereign 
for double jeopardy purposes . This result, however, would 
depend on the opinion in Oliphant not being written to 
say that tribes do not have inherent sovereignty. To be 
consistent with a reversal in Wheeler, the opinion in 
Oliphant would have to say that although tribes had inherent 
sovereignty (and still do, with respect to intra-Indian 
matters), § 1152 withdraws from the tribes jurisdiction over 
non-Indians in criminal matters. (And, of course, if Oliphant 
comes out saying that the tribes retain concurrent juris-
diction over non-Indians, there would be no conflict at all 
a reversal in 
with/Wheeler.) 
Although I am not comfortable with the prospect of 
denominating Indian tribes separate sovereignties (especially 
such tribes as th~ Suquamish), JPS' comments and questions at 
2. 
argument convinced me that the Court would have to overrule 
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), to decide in favor 
of resp in Wheeler, Talton held that the grand jury provision ---of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to trials of Indians 
• o( .... 
for intra-Indian crimes by tribes. The Court's reasoning 
-------....... ... ~ does not 
is explicit: the Cherokee nation/derives its powers from 
the federal government, and the plenary nature of Congress' 
control does not make a difference for purposes of applying 
the Fifth Amendment to the tribe. xxxkiRkxxke (I've attached 
the relevant part of the opinion.) I think the SG is right, 
too, in saying that Congress' enactment of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act in 1968 (which conferred some constitutional 
rights applicable in tribal trials) confirms the validity 
of Talton, or at least shows that Congress thought Talton was 
still good law. 
It has been suggested that Talton should not apply 
today because tribes and the nature of federal control kax have 
changed significantly. But I would not want to substitute 
a modern-day assessment of tribal sovereignty for the 
assessment of a Court that kax was closer to the time when 
tribes truly were sovereign. 
It has also been suggested that the relevance of Talton 
today is limited by the fact that states were not subject 
to the Fifth Amendment(through the Fourteenth) at the time 
Talton was decided. The Court might have thought it strange 
to apply constitutional requirements in the first eight 
amendments to Indian tribes, but not to states. Although this 
3. 
might have occurred to the Talton Court, I do not think 
it affected the analysis of the decision that much. If 
Indian tribes were considered instrumentalities of the 
federal government, then constitutional provisions would 
apply to the tribes even under Barron v. Baltimore, without 
regard to the situation with the states. Of course the 
Court might have been struck by the apparent anomaly of 
holding tribes but not states to constitutional strictures, 
but the Court's explicit discussion centered on the fact 
that tribes are separate sovereigns and not part of the 
federal government. 
I think it would be safe to reverse, unless the Court 
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Opinion of the Court. 
adoption, shall be th e ouly parties, or wheru the c:cnse of ac-
tion sba1l arise in th e Cherokee nation , exc-ept ~~s utLc:·wise 
proYided in this treaty." · 
So, also, in" An act to proYid.e a t emporary gon:rnment for 
the Territory of Oklalwma, to enlarge the jurisd ict ion of the 
United States court in the Indian Tcni tor:' , and Jor other 
purposes," approved :May 2, 1 SDO, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81, it was 
provided, in section 30, as follows: 
"That the judicial tribun als of the Indian nations shall re-
tain exclusiYe jurisdiction in all ci\•il and criminal cases arising 
in the countl'J in which members of the nation Ly nati Yi ty or 
by adoption shall be tbe only parties; and :-ts to all such c:-tses 
the 1:1ws of the State of Arkansas extended o\·er an d pn t in 
force in said Indian Territory by this act shall not apply." 
And section 31 of the last mentioned act closes with the 
following paragraph: 
"The Constitution of tbe United States and all generalla1Ys 
of the United States which prohibit crimes and misdemeanors 
in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States except in the District of Columbia, and aU laws 
relating to national banking associations, shall La,vc the same 
force and effect in the Indian Territory as elsewlwro in the 
United States; but nothing in this act shall be so construed 
as to dep1·ive any of the eonrts of the civilized nations of ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all cases arising \\·herein members of 
~aid nations, 11hether by treaty, blood or adoption, are the 
sole parties, nor so as to interfere with the l'ight and powers 
of said civilized nations to punish said members for violation 
of the statutes and laws enacted by their national councils 
where such laws are not contrary to the treaties and laws of 
the United States." 
The crime of murder committed b · one Cherokee Inc\ ian 
u )011 t 1e )erson of another within the ·nriscliction of the 
Cherokee nation is, there ore, cl eal'ly not an offence against 
tbe United States, but an offence against the local laws of 
the Cherokee nation. Necessa,rily, the stc1tutes of the United 
States \Yhich provide for an indictment l.Jy a grand jury, and 
the nnmber of persons who shall constitute such a body, have 
I 
JT 
:'\'·~ ,· ... 
3S2 OCTOBEU TER)f, 1895. 
Opiu iou of the Court. 
no P-pJ•l icatk•n, for such st:ttutcs relate only, if not otl.wl"i\ise 
specially provicic<l, to grnnd juries empanelled for tb e coul'ls 
• . of and under the laiYS of the United States. -- ~-~~"" ' 
The question, th erefore, is, does the Fifth Amendment to 
tl1e Constitution apply to tho locallCgislation of the Cherokee 
nation so as to require all prosecutions for offences committed 
againsttbe laws of that nation to be initiated by a grand jury 
organized in accordance >~ith the provisions of that amend-
ment. The solution of this question involves an inquiry as 
to the nature and origin of the power of local government 
exercised by the Cherokee nation and recognized to exist in 
it by the treaties and statutes a,bo\e referred to. Since the 
case of B anon v. Balti71W1'e, 7 Pet. 24:3, it has been settled 
th:tt the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States is a limitation only upon the powers of the General 
Government, that is, that the amendment operates solely on 
the Constitution itself by qualifying the powers of the Na-
tional Go,ernment which the Constitution called into being. 
To quote the language of Chief Justice J\Iarsball, this amend-
ment is limitative of the "po·wers granted in the instrument 
itself and not of distinct governments framed by different 
persons and for different purposes. If these propositions be 
correct, the Fifth Amendment must-be understood as restrain-
ing tbe lJOII·er of the Ge1'leral Government, riot as applicable to 
the States." The cases in this court which have sanctioned 
this view are too well recognized to render it necessary to 
do more tlJan merely refer to them. Fox v. OMo, 5 How. 
410, 424; ll ""itll ers Y. Buckley, 20 How. 84; Twitchell -v. The 
Oommomcea.lth, 7 Wall. 321; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 
557; Pecmson v. Yewdall, 05 U. S. 294, 296 ; Davis v. Texas, 
139 U . S. G51. 
The case in tbis regard therefore depends upon whether the 
powers of local government exercised by the Cherokee nation 
are Federal powers created by and springing from the Consti-
tution of the United States, and hence controlled by the Fifth 
Amendment to that Constitution, or whether they are local 
powers not created by the Constitution, although subject to 
















•' 1\.J.J, r q - .;:: 
























, 5 Iron·. 











T .\TIO~ ;:. ::\IA YES. 383 
l grcss. The 1·epe:1tcd n.d jud ications of this comt have long since answered t1e f 'rm cr qu estion in the negative. In Cherokee Nation Y. Gv .. rgia, 5 Pet.. 1, which inYol1ed the right 
of the Cherokee nation to maintain an original bill in this 
court as a foreign St~1te, which n-as ruled ad\ersely to that 
right, speaking through :Mr. Cl1ief Justice Marshall, this court 
&'tid (p. 16) : 
"Is the Cherokee nation a foreign State in the sense in 
1\-hich that term is used in the Constitution 1 
"The connsel for the plaintiifs ha,ve maintained the affirma-
ti\·e of this proposition with great earnestness and ability. 
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the cba,r-
acter of the Cherokees as a State, as a distinct political so-
ciety, separated from others, capable of managing its own 
affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority 
of the judges, been completely successful. They have been 
uniformly trea,tecl as a State from t!Je settlement of our coun-
try. The numerous treaties made \Yith them by the United 
States recognize them as a people capable of. maintaining the 
relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their politi-
cal character for any ' ' io1ation of their ·engagements or for 
any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States 
uy any indiYidnal of their community. La.ws ba,ve been en-
acted in the spirit of these tr-eaties. The acts of our govern-
dent plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a State, and 
the courts are uouncl by those acts." 
It cannot be dou uted, as said in Wm·cester v. The State of 
Ge01·gia, 6 Pet. 515, 5J9, that prior to the formation of the 
Constitution treaties \Yere made with the Cherokee tribes by 
1\-bich their autonomous existence ,,-as recognized. And in 
that case Chief J usticc }\farshall also said (p. 559) : 
"The Indian nations had al,yays been considered as distinct, 
ind ependent political commnnities, retaining their original nat-
ural rights. T1e very term 'nation,' so generally ap-
plied to them, means a 'people distinct from others.' The 
Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as 
those to be made, to be the supreme law of the hnd, has 
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties \Yith the Ind-
,. 
l' 
Opinion of H1e Court. 
12.u D.:~ : :_ 1s, ::end CCJP:;cquently aJmits their ra.nk among t hose 
pu\rers -.-.-Lo ~.1·e cap,,ble of making ii'eaties." 
In re-:.-}e,rin ;;· t l1e whole sul1jcct inl{ttgama v. Uni ted S tates, 
118 U. S_ 375, this court said (p. 3S1) : 
" W ith t he Indians th emselves these relations are eqnally 
d ifiicult to defi ne. They were, and always have -been, re-
ganlcd us ha ,-ing a semi-independent position when they 
prcsen -ed their trilJal relations; not as States, not us nations, 
not as possessed of the full attributes of sover~ignty, but as 
a separate people with the pmYer of regulating their internal 
and soc:al r elations, and thus far not brought under the la\YS 
of the r nion, or of the State within w bose limits they re-
sidctl." 
'l'rue it is that in many adjudications of this court the fact 
_bas been fully r ecognized, thut although possessed of these 
att ribu tes of local self governrnent, when exercising their 
tribal f unctions, all such rights are subject to the suprem; 
legislatiYe authol'ity of tlie United States. Cherokee JYation v. 
Ka.n;:;as Ra£lway Co., 135 U. S. 641, where tbe cases are fully 
. re\·iewed. But the existence of the right in Con gress to reg u-
illte the manner in whiCh tbe local po\Yc·rs of the Cherokee 
nation shall be exercic:ed does not render such local powers 
:Federal po we1'S a1'jsing from and created by the Constitution 
of the '[ nited Stntes. It follo'n that as the powers of locaT 
self goYel'JlllJ ent enjoyed uy the Cherokee nation existed prior 
to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth 
Amendment, which , as we have said, bad for its sole object 
to control the powers conferred by the Oonstitntion on the 
National Govemment. The fact that the Indian tribes are 
subject to the dominant authority of Congress, and that 
their po\Yers of local sell government are also opera.tecl upon 
and restrained by the general provisions of the Con'stitution 
of the United States, completely answers the a1·gum ent of 
incmwenience which was pressed in the discussion at bar. 
Tho claim that the finding of an indictment by a: grand jury 
.of less than thirteen violates the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is conclusively answered by llw·tado 
v. Cal-ijoTm~a, 110 U. S. 516,. and NcNulty Y. OalifoTnia, 1±9 •· t 
.· 
.• ~-
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-;_·. S. C-+~·. Tl e 'f'e;:,tion \Yhether a statuto of tLe Cherokee 
!-at :,n ·,.1, ;, .. ]; \'. ;,.s not repugnant t.o t.Le Oom:titut.ion of the 
Cnited States or in contlict with any treaty or law of the 
enited Shtes had been repealed by another statute of that 
nation, and the determination of what \Yas the existing law 
of the OlJerokee nation as to the constitution of the grand 
jury, were solely matters within the jurisdiction of the courts 
of tha.t nation, and the decision of such a question in itself 
necessarily involves no infraction of the Constitution of the 
Unitetl States. Such has been the decision of this court with 
reference to similar contentions arising upon an indictment 
and conviction in a state court. In re Dnncan, 139 U. S. 
449. Tbe ruling in tlmt case is equally applicable to the con-
tentions in this parLkular arising hom the record before ns. 
The counsel for the appellant has Yery properly abandoned 
any claim to relief because of alleged errors occurring snbse· 
quent to the finding of the indictment. As to the point raiseq 
in reference to the date of the commission of the offence as 
stated in the i-ndictment, the record as corrected shows that 
the error in gnes_tion did not exist. It is, therefore, unneces· 
s:try to notice the argument based upon the assumption that 
the indictment charged the offence to have been committed 
su bsequcnt to the finding of the .true bill. 
The judgment :is -· 
lUR. J !JcTWE .FL~RLAN dissented. 
Affirmed. 
::M:EYER v. RICHARDS. 
EJUWR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 
EASTli:RN DISTRICT OF I.Ol'ISIANA. 
·No. 39. Submitted October 25, 1894.- Decid<·d :May ~5, l89G. 
A. , an alien, sold to B. in ~ew Orle11.ns thirteen bonds of the State of Louis-
iana, defivcred them to him, and receiYcd from !lim }Jayment. for them in 
full. Doth parties contemplated thu purcklse :lnd ddinry of ''alid an d 
VOL. CLXJ!l-25 
. ·. 
sovereign powers of the tribes were, and, then, how far and 
( in what respects these powers have been limited.' 'It 
must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were 
once independent and sovereign nations' •.• who, though conquered 
and dependent, retain those powers of autonomous states that are 
neither inconsistent with their status nor expressly terminated 
by Congress." 544 F.2d at 1009. 
3. Indian authority as federal authority. 
Indian tribunals are not free to violate basic 
due process rights, even if they are not held to all the require-
ments of federal courts. (See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, supra.} 
The application of due process indicates an overriding restric-
tion on tribal "residual authority." 
Further, the Ninth Circuit's application of the Tenth 
Amendment is instructive: Indian jurisdiction must be fit in 
under either federal or state authority (unless it is construed 
to be "retained by the people."} In McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm; Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973}, this Court addressed 
the source of federal authority over Indian matters: "[l.] t is 
now generally recognized that the power derives from federal 
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and 
for treaty making. See U.S. CONST. ART I § 8, cl. 3; AR'I'. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2 II 411 U.S. at 172 n. 7. That of course, does 
not directly address the source of internal tribal authority, 
but, in describing the evolution of these concepts, the Court 
observed, "the trend has been away from the idea of inherent 
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance --on federal pre-emption." It is not contested that the Congress 
could remove all authority from Indian tribunals. The fact that 
it has not done so could be seen as a kind of negative authority 
or tolerance, which would still involve the federal sovereign 
sufficiently to warrant the conclusion that the Congress approved 
~ 
(at least tac itly) the prosecution of an individual for violation 
"'--' 
of tribal law. Then double jeopardy would be involved if another \ 
prosecution followed in federal court for the same acts. \ 
The strongsst case for this viewpoint is Keeble v. U.S., 
412 U.S. 205 (1973). In Keeble, a defendant was held to be 
entitled to a "lesser included offense'' instruction in federal 
district court even though that lesser offense was exclusively 
within tribal jurisdiction. The Court held that the .Major 
Crimes Act required those specified crimes to be tried as though 
they had been committed off th€ reservation, and part of that 
treatment involved the usual instruction on lesser included 
offenses. The government had argued that such an instruction 
would "infringe the tribe's residual jurisdiction," but the 
Court was not convinced. Under the reasoning of Keeble, any Indian 
crime could be adjudicated in a federal district court if it 
were possibly characterizable as a lesser included offense of 
one of the "major crimes" listed in the Major Crimes Act. 
· Clearly, that result would not obtain for federal criminal trials 
involving lesser, included state crimes. 
4. Recornrnenda tion .: 
The trend of Keeble and McClanahan is unmistakably -
away from former concepts of residual sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
the rules set down in Waller and Grafton for determining identity 
of sovereignty refer to the source of authority, the place from 
which it originally "sprang." The Ninth Circuit is divided 
- 0 -------------------------~--------------------
within itself on the proper treatment of this question. I 
recommend that this question is deserving of being resolved by 
the Court. 
B. Lesser and Included Offense. 
There is an accepted test for determining whether 
two offenses are sufficiently similar so that sequential 
prosecution will constitute a v~l:tio~ of double je~ardy. 
-----------~--------'---,~--~ '--------------
I 
"If each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the 
other does not," then the two offenses are sufficiently different. 
The test was first expressed in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 
433, and the Supreme Judicial Court's formulation was explicitly 
adopted by this court in Gavieres v. U.S., 220 U.S. 338 (1911). 
I 
The telling point is whether each offense is found to require -
a unique element of proof, not whether only one offense has a 
unique element. Gavieres held no double jeopardy for prosecutions 
involving "behaving in an indecent manner in a public place" and 
"misbehavior addressed to a public official." It is clearly possible 
to commit either one of these without committing the other. In 
Diaz v. U.S., 223 U.S. 442 (1912), a conviction for assault and 
battery preceded a conviction for homicide. However, the 
facts are quite sui generis: the victim had still been living at 
the time of the first prosecution, and the second prosecution was 
brought upon his death. 
I 
Applied to the facts here, the Morey test indicates that 
elements of statutory rape included all the elements of contributing - _____..... 
to the delinquency of a minor in the manner in which both offenses .... 
were committed. Although rape required more proof, the events of 
the incident required to prove the delinquency charge were also 
necessary to prove the rape charge. The Solicitor's reliance 
on Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 , (1932) (one sale of -------morphine violated provisions against selling from package other 
than original, and against selling except in pursuance of a 
written order) and Henry v. U.S., 215 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1954) · 
(facilitation of transportation of and sale of heroin) is misplaced, 
since the events alleged to constitute proof of one crime did 
not fit perfectly within the events necessary to prove the other. 
The possibility of different offenses is not sufficiently 
realistic to allow this Court to avoid the sovereignty issue. 
4. REC0r-1MENDATION: Cert should be granted. 
NOTE: This case is related to the issue raised in Oliphant v. ~ 
Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), for which cert. has, in 
separate papers, also been requested. 
8/8/77 
tap 
A response has been filed. 
Campbell CA op in Petn. 
G-
ORANDUM 
Summer List 9, Shee mem. of SG 
No. 76-1629 Cert to CA 9 (Goodwin, Sneed, East) 
UNITED STATES 
v. 
WHEELER Fed/CRIM Timely/ w. ext. 
The Solicitor has filed a supplemental memorandum for 
the purpose of bringing to the Court's attention the decision 
of the Eighth Circuit in U.S. v. John Walking Crow (Aug. 10, 1977). 
The case involved prosecution of an Indian in tribal court for 
simple theft, followed by prosecution in federal district court 
for robbery under the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
~~'!'. ~ sU~~ ~ 
~~ M ~:;/t:f6~~-
. ~~~~~ 
This is the same statute that is at issue in United States v. 
Wheeler. The Eighth Circuit found that there was no question 
that the two crimes were so related that prosecution for both 
of them by the same sovereign would constitute a violation of 
the double jeopardy clause. 
However, the court held that the Indian Nations are, for 
purposes of that clause, independent sovereigns from the government --
of the United States. The Eighth Circuit realized that it was 
thus in square conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
in Wheeler, but ruled "we disagree with its holding and decline 
to follow it." 
The rationale of the Eighth Circuit was that Indian sovereignty 
predated federal sovereignty, and has lapsed only to the explicit 
extent that the federal government has exerted its authority. 
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal court had no jurisdiction 
over a murder of an Indian by an Indian in the Dakota Territory 
in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). That case occasioned 
the Indian Major Crimes Act, but the Eighth Circuit relies on it 
as establishing the independent nature of the Indian sovereignty. 
The earlier memorandum recommended that cert. be granted; 
the presence of a square conflict between the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits further supports that recommendation. 
In this memo, I will also take the opportunity to note that 
cert. has been granted in Oliphant v. Suquamish, No. 76-5729, 
last June 12. That case considers whether Indian Tribal courts 
have jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with violations of 
Indian law while on Indian reservations. The earlier memorandum 
reported that cert. had been applied for in Oliphant . . The briefs 
were due on August 30. This was already an extension, but to 
date, no briefs have yet been received. 
9/8/77 Campbell 8th Cir. op in 
supp. mem. of SG 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Bregstein Jan. 9, 1978 
RE: No. 76-1629, United States v. Wheeler 
This case presents the question whether it 
violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 
for resp to be tried in federal court for statutory rape 
when he has been tried and convicted of a lesser included 
offense by a tribal court. The parties seem to agree that 
the answer depends on whether the source of authority for 
the two trials is in the same sovereign, under the 
reasoning of Abbate v. United States, 359 u.s. 187. The \ 
difficulty in the case, as in Oliphant, is in determining 
the nature of the tribe's "sovereignty". 
2 • 
The most relevant precedents are Abbate, supra, 
and several cases involving the relationship between 
sovereignties and their instrumentalities: Grafton v. 
United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Waller v. Florida, 397 
u.s. 387 (1970); and Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U.S. 
253 (1937). In Grafton the Court held that an Army private 
could not be tried in a territorial court in the 
Philippines after having been acquitted of a lesser 
included offense in a court-martial. The court reasoned: 
"If •.. a person be tried for an offense in a tribunal 
deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the United 
States and is acquitted or convicted, he cannot again be 
tried for the same offense in another tribunal deriving its 
jurisdiction and authority from the United States." 206 
U.S. at 352. In explaining why the situation of 
territorial and military courts differed from the situation 
of state and federal courts, the Court said: 
"The Government of a State does not derive its 
powers from the United States, while the 
Government of the Philippines owes its existence 
wholly to the United States, and its judicial 
tribunals exert all their powers by authority of 
the United States. The jurisdiction and authority 
of the United States over that territory and its 
inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of 
government, is paramount." 
Id. at 354 (emphasis supplied). Waller followed Grafton in 
holding that municipalities derive their authority from the 
state so that the double jeopardy clause, as applied to the 
3. 
states, would prohibit trial in a state co~rt after 
conviction in a municipal court. 
The difficulty in applying the principles of the 
dual sovereignty exception in the context of an Indian 
tribe is that the tribe's status, and its claim to ~ 
• 
"severe ignty", is quite ambiguous. As noted in the '-'d~~+C ·~,/;;(' 
Oliphant briefs and bench memo, the Court has adverted to 
tribal sovereignty on many occasions, but usually this hasz:-'t-lt.( 
been in support of some action of the federal government~
that singles out Indian tribes, or in opposition to an ~ /~ • 
assertion of the state's jurisdiction. The former can be 
explained in terms of Congress' plenary power to regulate 
Indian affairs; the latter in terms of federal preemption 
and plenary power over Indians. 
The one thing that is clear about tribal ~~ ~ 
sovereignty is that it is not "full" sovereignty. It is ~ ~ 
widely acknowledged that Congress has plenary power to 
regulate Indian tribes, and this power includes the power 
to waive a tribe's sovereign immunity, United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 309 U.S. 506, 
512-13; unilaterally to abrogate treaties by statute, Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 553; and to withdraw criminal 
or civil jurisdiction from the tribe. In view of the 
plenary nature of Congress' control over Indian tribes, it 
really cannot be said that tribes are sovereign in the way 
4. 
that the federal government or the states ,are. {This is a 
slightly different question from the one in Oliphant, where 
tribal sovereignty--if recognized at all--is recognized 
only because Congress has chosen to let it continue.) 
With this in mind, the language in Grafton becomes 
relevant. Although no one contends that the tribes 
originally obtained their authority from the federal 
government, as the Court described the situation to be in 
Grafton, today the tribes' authority exists at the pleasure 
of the federal government and according to the vicissitudes 
of congressional policy .. The same is not true of states. 
It could be said that the tribes exercise their authority 
"by the authority of the United States"~ and it is clear 
that federal authority is paramount to that of the tribe, 
and not just in the sense of federal supremacy. Congress' 
power over the tribes is plenary, and whatever sovereignty 
the tribes have is "dependent" on the "dominant" 
sovereignty of the United States. United States v. United 
States Fidelity Co, supra, at 512. 
The third case mentioned above, Puerto Rico V. The 
Shell Co., involved a prosecution under Puerto Rico's 
--=-= 
equivalent of the Sherman Act. One of the claims raised by 
the defendant was it might be subjected to double 
prosecution, by Puerto Rico and then by the United States. 
The Court rejected this contention on the ground that a 
second prosecution would be barred by the ~ouble jeopardy 
clause. Earlier in the opinion, the Court had described 
Puerto Rico's powers of self-government and noted that the 
purpose of two congressional statutes (the Foraker Act and 
the Organic Act) 
5 • 
"was to give Puerto Rico full power of local 
self-determination, with an autonomy similar to 
that of the states and incorporated territories. 
[Citations omitted.] The effect was to confer 
upon the territory many of the attributes of 
quasi-sovereignty possessed by the states--as, for 
example, immunity from suit without their 
consent. • .. The power of taxation, the power 
to enact and enforce laws, and other 
characteristically governmental powers were 
vested. And so far as local matters are 
concerned, as we have already shown in respect of 
the continental territories, legislative powers 
were conferred nearly, if not quite, as extensive 
as those exercised by the state legislatures." 
302 u.s. at 262. In spite of all these attributes of 
sovereignty, the Court had no trouble concluding that the 
principle of Grafton applied because "[b)oth the 
territorial and federal laws and the courts, whether 
exercising federal or local jurisdiction, are creations 
emanating from the same sovereignty. Resp. concludes from 
this that the dual sovereignty exception has been limited 
to the state/federal context. 
The SG suggests, brief at 31 n. 13, that the 
Shell case might be decided differently today, in view of 
the fact that Puerto Rico attained "quasi-statehood" in 
1952 when Congress "relinquished its control over the 
6. 
organization of the local affairs of the tsland and granted 
Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that 
possessed by the States", Examining Board of Engineers v. 
Flores de Otero, 426 u.s. 572, 597. The SG says that 
resp's use of the Shell case is "misleading" since resp 
quotes from Flores in establishing the "quasi-statehood" of 
Puerto Rico. While the SG's point is well-taken with 
respect to the degree of independence now recognized in 
Puerto Rico, the description in the Shell opinion itself 
Puerto Rico's powers of self-government before 1952 made 




Thus the sole - and potentially critical -
~~~c·...u~ 
~ ';i.4L .. i...,_ ~ 
-distinction between the case of an Indian tribe and the -situations in Grafton, Waller, and Shell, comes down to the 
original source of the entity's authority. The present 
extent of exercise of sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers 
does not differ. In view of the fact that the nature of 
original tribal sovereignty is far from clear, this seems 
like a very abstract point on which to rest a decision that 
the dual sovereignty exception applies in the case of an 
Indian tribe. The shakiness of this position is aggravated 
by the disrepute in which the dual sovereignty exception 
has found itself lately. Since the Court may reconsider 
this exception sometime in the future, it would not seem 
advisable to expand the exception to appl~ to an entity 
whose true sovereignty is questionable and whose lack of 
full sovereignty is undisputed. 
The only rationale for recognizing the dual 
sovereignty exception in this context would be the 
government's identification of "undesirable consequences" 
that would ensue if double jeopardy were a bar to federal 
prosecution in this kind of case. The government claims 
that Congress would ne-put to the choice of foregoing 
federal prosecution of individuals tried by a tribal court 
(even if the defendant pled guilty in tribal court and 
receivedto a relatively minor sentence) or cutting back 
the power of tribal courts to try offenders. 
This is a legitimate concern. But if Congress 
chose the latter alternative, the result would not be 
7 . 
terribly different from the state of affairs existing today 
in the context of major crimes committed by Indians, (the 
~jor { rimes ~t does not apply to non-Indians) and in 
certain respects, it would be preferable. As mentioned in 
the Oliphant memo, it is an open question--at least in this 
Court--whether the Major Crimes Act (18 u.s.c. § 1153) 
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction or concurrent 
tribal and federal jurisdiction over Indians who commit the 
enumerated major offenses. Yet even if tribal courts can 
try Indians for major offenses, they can impose 
8 . 
sentences of not more than 6 months imprisonment and/or a 
$500 fine. Part of the reason that an offender can get off 
lightly by being tried first in a tribal court is that the 
tribal courts are so limited in their sentencing power. 
But this is a bad state of affairs even without regard to 
the double jeopardy problem. It would make much more sense 
to limit tribal authorities to prosecution for minor 
offenses, if their sentencing power is to be so 
circumscribed. 
Thus Congress could limit tribal jurisdiction to 
offenses, enumerated by Congress, that reasonably might be 
punished within the sentencing authority now possessed by 
the tribes. Since it seems to be acknowledged that there 
is not a great deal of federal interest in prosecuting 
minor offenses, a strict separation of the two 
jurisdictions (minor offenses in the tribe and major 
offenses in the federal government) would make a lot more 
sense than the present situation and would not be an 
undesirable consequence at all. 
Unfortunately, the above solution solves only part 
of the problem. In this case, for example, resp was 
charged in tribal court with disorderly conduct and 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. If the double 
jeopardy clause is applicable, the charge on contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor would be sufficient to bar 
9 • 
the federal prosecution for statutory rape because it is a 
lesser included offense of rape. Yet there could have been 
no federal prosecution for the lesser included offense 
alone, cf. Keeble v. United States, 412 u.s. 205; and while 
the tribe could have brought the contributing-to-the-
delinquency-of-a-minor charge even if the Major Crimes Act 
provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over the 
enumerated crimes. 
Aside from the Major Crimes Act, the other primary 
source of federal authority over alleged offenses that take 
place on a reservation is 18 u.s.c. § 1152 (the interracial 
crimes provision). Here there would be significant double 
jeopardy problems, if, as we have discussed in Oliphant, 
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the tribe and the 
federal government. (The supposed "double jeopardy 
exception" in § 1152 really does not deal with double 
jeopardy. The exception is for "Indians committing any 
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the 
local laws of the tribe" (emphasis supplied). The 
exception does not apply when an Indian has been acquitted 
by the tribe.) In addition, the exception does not mention 
non-Indians. There, assuming that § 1152 provides for 
concurrent jurisdiction, the federal government would be 
hampered in its prosecution of non-Indians for all criems 
(major and minor) under § 1152 and its prosecutions of 
10. 
Indians for major and minor crimes, brought under § 1152, 
when the defendant had been acquitted by the tribal court. 
Assuming arguendo that the federal government is not 
greatly concerned with prosecution of minor crimes, and 
that Congress could or amend or clarify § 1153 to vest 
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes in the federal 
government, I doubt that courts would allow tribes to 
prosecute non-Indians for major crimes simply because §1152 
jurisdiction is concurrent (if the Court so holds in 
Oliphant) . By implication from the hypothetical amendment 
of § 1153 and the limited sentencing power of tribal 
courts, tribes could not prosecute non-Indians for major 
crimes. Thus the entire problem probably would come down 
to two situations: potential double prosecution of (i) 
4----...J\ 
non-Indians for minor crimes,A. (Ii ) Indians who had been 
acquitted of minor crimes. Since I have assumed as a 
general matter that the federal government is not concerned 
about prosecuting the minor offenses, the basic problem 
would be the preclusion of federal prosecutions for major 
crimes when the defendant had been tried in tribal 
a charge that amounts to a lesser included offense of the 
federal charge. 
m~ 
This strikes 9fte as a problem. It is arguable, as 
a policy matter, that both the federal and tribal 
governments have an interest in prosecuting an offender 
11. 
under their respective criminal codes, especially when the 
definition of offenses is so different (as in the instant 
case) . But I cannot see a real difference between this 
situation and the situation in Waller v. Florida, supra. 
There the municipality charged the defendant (who allegedly 
stole a mural from city hall and paraded it through the 
streets) with violation of two of its ordinances: 
destruction of city property and disorderly conduct. After 
the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 180 days in 
jail, the state charged him with grand larceny (for which 
the defendant eventually was sentenced to 6 months to 5 
years in jail) . Of course Waller is distinguishable on the 
basic ground that there "the judicial power to try [the 
defendant] on the first charges in municipal court springs 
from the same organic law that created the state court of 
general jurisdiction ••. ", 397 U.S. at 393, the same 
policy arguments made the the se in Wheeler would apply in 
Waller. Again, the critical question comes down to whether 
the original source of authority, rather than the present 
" '--""" -
s~ce of that authority, for all practical purposes, is to 
' be determinative. I suppose it might also be said that tribe members 
owe a kind of allegiance to their tribe that does not exist in 
other contexts outside of the state or the federal government. 
is 
In short, this/a very difficult issue aRa whose resolution really 
might go either way. 
I will address only two of the SG's arguments that this case 
falls within an exception to the double jeopardy clause other 
suggested 
than the dual sovereignty exception. (Three of the other/exceptions--
12. 
identified in Jeffers v. United States and described in the 
SG's brief at 44-45--simply are not applicable on the facts 
of this case. See resp's brief at 42-44.) The t~ other 
potential exceptions identified by the SG are (1) WJB's 
suggestion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 n. 7, that 
an exception to the double jeopardy clause may be M "necessary 
if no single court had jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes" 
and (2) a proposed exception to take account of the unique 
federal/Indian relationship. 
(1) I am not sure that WJB's suggested exception would 
apply outside of his "same transaction" theory of double 
jeopardy. ~XRHXKXXH;xxRHXHX£H~XimRXH8aiBXRRXHXR~~iiea The 
Court has not el articulated such a theory, and such an 
exception would have been applicable in Wallr, supra. The 
municipal and state offenses in Waller were defined x~ea 
separately, and neither court had jurisdiction of the offenses 
cognizable by the other court. 
(2) This second exception is described by the SG as 
applicable in "a middle range of dual-authcrity cases where the 
Clause applies in its essentials, but where its impact on pros-
ecution for a greater offense after conviction s for a lesser 
included offense is not subject to the analysis of Brown 
[v. Ohio]. For the full explanation of the SG's theory, see 
its brief at 44-45 n. 26. I do not think this theory will 
work. The SG suggests this theory for situations where "the 
two legislative bodies [are] sufficientjy separate and independent, 
and the two statutes which the defendant is accused of vimiating 
-
13. 
sufficiently different in the interests they seek to vindicate, 
that the approach adopted in Brown v. Ohio for successive prose-
cutions by 'a State or the Federal Government' may not apply." 
Although this is an attractive theory in some respects, it 
seems that it would apply equally to the differences between 
military and mederal courts, or territorial and federal 
courts, or small-town municipal courts and state courts . 
If xkaxaixxiR£kiaR Indian tribes are somehow different from 
all of these, it would seem better to£.a:i call them "sovereign" 
for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, and thereby to 
allow multiple prosecutions, than to £X carve out this exception 
which sounds like it might also apply to the situations the 
Court already has decided trigger the double jeopardy clause. 
The only advantage of adopting this theory is that it would 
be limited to prosecutions for greater and lesser offenses, 
and would not always allow a second prosecution; but I have not 
been able to determine the theoretical justification for this 
theory. 
In short, another difficult question as to which I have no -
certain answer. 
N.B. 
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CHAMBERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~ttpt"tlttt <!}llttd llf tqt 'Pnittb .§taf.tg 
'JlhtGftingLtn, ~. <!}. 2!lbJ'-1~ 
January 16, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-1629, United States v. Wheeler 
I tentatively vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. While I believe that tribes retain certain rights of 
self-government through a residual sovereignty not deriving 
from the federal Constitution but pre-existing it, I do not at 
this time think that different sources of sovereignty 
necessarily require application of the "dual sovereign" 
doctrine of Abbate. What strikes me as peculiar about the 
relationship between the tribes and the federal government is 
the plenary nature of Congress' authority to act vis-a-vis the 
tribes. Unlike the states, whose sovereignty (and concomitant 
police power) is protected and recognized in the Constitution, 
the tribes continue to possess any criminal jurisdiction at all 
wholly at the sufferance of the federal government (absent 
limiting treaty language); and Congress has enacted numerous 
statutes arguably controlling the tribes' criminal 
jurisdiction, 18 u.s.c. 1152, 1153, and the manner in which 
such jurisdiction is exercised, 25 u.s.c. 1301 et seq. 
For these reasons, I am presently inclined to believe that 
the relationship between the tribes and the United States is 
more comparable to that of the territories and the United 
States, Grafton v. United States, 206 u.s. 333, or 
municipalities and states, Waller v. Florida, 397 u.s. 387, 
than it is to that of the states and the federal government, 
which, as the SG's office has conceded, are the only full 
sovereign powers in the United States. My vote is tentative, 
however, since the majority opinion in this case or 
developments in Oliphant or Santa Clara may persuade me 
otherwise. 
T.M. 
~u.prtmt Q}llltrl1tf t4t 'J!Urittlt .:§taftg 
jtasfrhtgLnt. tB. <!J. 2ll~J!.$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUJST 
March 2, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1629 -United States v. Wheeler 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 




United States v. Wheeler 
'· 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~U}lrtnu (!):curt of tlrt ~ttittb ~hrlts , 
Jfa.sltbtghm. :!B. (!):. 20~'1-~ 
Re: 76-1629 - United States 
v. Wheeler 
Dear Potter, 
Please join me. 
March 4, 1978 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:pr ~uu> Cltll1lrl ltf tit~~~ ~hdt$ 
11frurlfi:ttghnt. !}. <!f. 2!T~'*.;l 
• I 
March 8, 1978 
Re: 76-1629 - United States v. Wheeler 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Btewart 




..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~npunu <qttnrl ttf tltt 'Jltttitth ~fattg 
~rullp:ttgf!ttt, 10. ~. 2!lglJ1,~ 
March 8, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1629 - United States v. Wheeler 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~(}~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
..inprtmt <!1ourt ltf tlrt ~lt ~ • 
'~lhts!pnghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll,?~~ 
March 14, 1978 
Re: 76-1629 - United States v. Wheeler 
Dear Potter: 
/ 
I . join. The Oliphant dissent having persuaded 
only one (myself), it is now "gospel," and unless 
Thurgood writes as persuasively here as he did(for me) 
in Oliphant, I bow to heavier, if not better, "firepower". 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
I I 
~~ I . .,. 
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